The classical Heckscher-Ohlin-Mundell paradigm states that trade and capital mobility are substitutes. In this paper we show that in a world with heterogeneous …nancial development, the classic conclusion does not hold. In particular, in less …nancially developed economies (South), trade and capital mobility are complements. Within a dynamic framework, the complementarity carries over to (…nancial) capital ‡ows. This interaction implies that deepening trade integration in South raises net capital in ‡ows (or reduces net capital out ‡ows). It also implies that, at the global level, protectionism may back…re if the goal is to rebalance capital ‡ows, when these are already heading from South to North. We derive these results in a benchmark model that isolates heterogenous …nancial contractibility across countries and sectors as the driving force shaping comparative advantage. We show, however, that our results continue to hold under plausible conditions when incorporating Heckscher-Ohlin determinants of comparative advantage. Our perspective also has implications for the e¤ects of trade integration on factor prices. In contrast to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, trade liberalization always decreases the wage-rental in South: an anti-Stolper-Samuelson result.
Introduction
The process of globalization involves the integration of goods and …nancial markets of heterogeneous economies. While these two dimensions of integration are deeply intertwined in practice, the economics literature has kept them largely separate. International trade deals with the former while macroeconomics with the latter. In this paper we argue that such separation is not warranted when …nancial frictions are an important source of heterogeneity across countries and sectors. In particular, we show that in this context trade and capital ‡ows are complements. A …nancially underdeveloped economy that opens the capital account without liberalizing trade is likely to experience capital out ‡ows. An aggressive trade liberalization can reverse the out ‡ows. At the global level, a rise in protectionism may exacerbate rather than reduce the so called "global imbalances."
While some of these implications may resonate with practitioners, they are in stark contrast with those that follow from the classical Heckscher-Ohlin-Mundell paradigm (HOM). In the neoclassical two-good, two-factor model, provided that a small open economy produces both goods, free trade brings about factor price equalization (FPE) with the rest of the world. When this happens, international capital mobility becomes irrelevant. By the same token, if a capital-scarce small open economy sets a tari¤ on its import sector, it triggers a capital in ‡ow to the point at which FPE is restored. In sum, in HOM trade and capital in ‡ows are substitutes.
The key di¤erence between our model and the HOM one, aside from the dynamic aspects that allow us to talk about …nancial ‡ows rather than just physical capital mobility, is the presence of …nancial frictions. Motivated by the …ndings of King and Levine (1993) , Shleifer and Vishny (1997) , Rajan and Zingales (1998) , Manova (2007) , and many others, we highlight two dimensions of heterogeneity in …nancial frictions. First, there is cross-country heterogeneity. The ability to pledge future output to potential …nanciers is higher in rich "North" than in developing "South."
Second, there is cross-sectoral heterogeneity. Even when operating under a common …nancial system, producers in certain sectors …nd it more problematic to obtain …nancing than producers in others sectors. Paraphrasing Rajan and Zingales (1998) , some sectors are more "dependent" on …nancial infrastructure than others. In this context, both trade and capital ‡ows become market mechanisms to circumvent the misallocation of capital induced by …nancial frictions in South. If we close the trade channel, then both physical and …nancial capital out ‡ows from South become the vehicle through which the return to savers and the sectoral allocation of capital are improved in South. 1 In contrast, with free trade, it is the reorganization of domestic production in South that does the heavy-lifting, and by doing so raises the return on capital in South and palliates or even reverses capital out ‡ows. 2 Intuitively, international trade allows for an allocation of factors 1 In one-sector models, capital ‡ows are the only mechanism to increase the return to capital in …nancially underdeveloped countries. The literature highlighting this mechanism is large and includes Gertler and Rogo¤ (1990) , Boyd and Smith (1997) , Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) , Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004) , Kraay et al. (2005) , as well as the more recent (working) papers by Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2006) , Aoki, Benigno and Kiyotaki (2006) , and Mendoza, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2007) . 2 There is a trade literature emphasizing the role of the interaction between …nancial development and …nancial dependence in shaping international trade ‡ows. It includes the work of Bardhan and Kletzer (1987) , Beck (2002) , Matsuyama (2005) , Wynne (2005) , Ju and Wei (2006) , and Manova (2007) . These papers, however, focus on deriving across sectors that is (partially) detached from local demand conditions and this allows Southern capital to work with more labor in the sector with lower …nancial frictions.
In order to formalize these insights, in section 2 we develop a standard 2 2 general equilibrium model of international trade in which …rms hire capital and labor to produce homogenous goods in two sectors. To capture the role of heterogeneous …nancial frictions across countries and sectors in the simplest possible way, we enrich the standard model by incorporating a …nancial market imperfection in one of the two sectors. In particular, we assume that one of the two sectors produces a relatively "complex" good that only a subset of capital owners, the "entrepreneurs", know how to produce. This same complexity of the good introduces informational asymmetries that place an upper bound on the share of the future return that can be pledged to outsiders. As long as this credit multiplier or the share of the capital stock in the hands of entrepreneurs are su¢ ciently small, the …nancial friction binds and the amount of capital that the economy allocates to the constrained sector is suboptimal. In such an event, entrepreneurs obtain a premium return on their capital, while the rewards obtained by uninformed capital owners and workers are relatively depressed.
We …rst consider the autarkic equilibrium of this simple economy in which goods and factor markets have to clear domestically. In such a case, countries with worse …nancial institutions (i.e., with lower credit multipliers) feature a lower relative price of the unconstrained sector's output and also feature relatively depressed wages and returns to uninformed capital. In this context, if we allow capital to move across countries that di¤er only in …nancial development, capital ‡ows from the …nancially underdeveloped South to the …nancially developed North (provided, of course, that international factor payments can be settled with international shipments of one of the two goods). 3 Moving back to the case without capital mobility, we then consider the case in which South can freely trade with a …nancially developed North. We show that in that case, South specializes in the unconstrained sector and thus becomes a net importer of the output of the "…nancial dependent" sector. From the point of view of South, trade integration results in an increase in the relative price of the unconstrained sector's output and also increases the real return to uninformed capital.
Intuitively, South specializes in the sector in which capital owners need to share less rents (in fact, no rents) with entrepreneurs, and this reduced rent-sharing coupled with the depressed Southern wages work to improve the return to (uninformed) capital. Although we initially derive this result for the case in which South is a small open economy and preferences and technologies are CobbDouglas, we later demonstrate that the result is fully general. In particular, in a world in which countries di¤er only in …nancial development and sectors di¤er only in …nancial dependence, trade integration reduces (and sometimes overturns) the gap between the real return to capital in North and South.
In such a world, trade does not bring about factor price equalization and the rate of return to (and testing) implications for trade ‡ows and do not allow for capital mobility.
capital ends up being higher in South than in North. This "overshooting" result follows from the fact that, in the free trade equilibrium, North produces a disproportionate amount of output in an industry (the …nancially dependent one) where capital intensity is suboptimal. As a result, the residual capital-labor ratio available to the unconstrained sector is larger in North and South, and this makes the return to capital higher in South. The counterpart of this result is that workers in South produce with relatively less capital in the unconstrained sector, and thus wages remain lower in South than in North.
A straightforward implication of these results is that, from the point of view of South, trade and capital mobility are complements. As goods markets become more integrated, the di¤erential return to capital in North vs. South becomes smaller and smaller, and for low enough trade frictions, this di¤erential turns negative and there is an incentive for capital to ‡ow from North to South. This holds despite the fact that North and South feature the same aggregate capital-labor ratios. In section 3, we characterize the equilibrium with capital mobility and show that the complementarity works in both directions, in the sense that Northern capital ‡ows to the unconstrained sector in South and increases trade ‡ows between countries. 4 We …rst develop this argument in a static model where the only possible type of capital ‡ows involve movements of physical capital across countries. In section 4, we develop a dynamic model that illustrates that our mechanism has similar implications for …nancial capital ‡ows (that is, for ‡ows of ownership claims). In doing so, we build on the overlapping-generations framework developed by Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2006) . Physical capital plays a dual role in the dynamic model: it is an input in production, but also serves as a store of value. As a consequence, our model features a wedge between the interest rate and the rental rate of capital. In a world without …nancial integration, interest rates are higher in countries with a large supply of …nancial assets relative to their demand. The relative size of asset supply and demand is in turn tightly related to the share of a country's income that is capitalizable. Under the plausible assumption that neither labor income nor entrepreneurial rents are capitalizable, our static model implies that countries with underdeveloped …nancial markets feature relatively low interest rates under trade and …nancial autarky, but relatively high interest rates with free trade and …nancial autarky. As a result, trade and (…nancial) capital in ‡ows are also complements in South. 5 Our benchmark model isolates the e¤ects of cross-country and cross-sectoral heterogeneity in …nancial frictions on the structure of trade and capital ‡ows. In section 5, we introduce HeckscherOhlin determinants of international trade into our static model. We focus on the empirically relevant case in which the …nancially underdeveloped South is also relatively capital scarce and the constrained sector features a higher elasticity of output with respect to capital than the un-4 Markusen (1983) shows that that this second level of complementarity (from capital mobility to trade ‡ows) can be derived in a variety of models in which comparative advantage is not driven by di¤erences in capital-labor ratios across countries. In our paper, we focus on the …rst type of complementarity going from trade integration to capital mobility, which is absent in his framework. Another di¤erence between Markusen (1983) and our paper is that he did not explore the role of …nancial frictions, which are of course central in our context. 5 As an aside, note that our framework hints that the order in which developing economies liberalize their trade and capital accounts is important for the direction of capital ‡ows in the transition. constrained sector. Under these circumstances, we show that the autarkic price of the constrained sector is relatively lower in South both because of the forces unveiled in our benchmark model, but also (in most cases) because of the standard Heckscher-Ohlin forces that make labor intensive goods cheaper in labor abundant countries. 6 As a result, trade integration again translates into an increase in the relative price of the unconstrained sector in South, it pulls labor into that sector, and increases the real return to uniformed capital. Hence, as in our benchmark model, trade integration raises the rental rate of (uninformed) capital in South relative to that in North. Furthermore, regardless of relative factor endowments di¤erences and relative factor intensity di¤erences, our model always generates a decrease in the Southern wage-rental ratio after trade liberalization: an anti-Stolper- Samuelson e¤ect. 7 In section 5, we also derive conditions under which the complementarity between trade ‡ows and capital mobility is large enough to ensure that capital moves from North to South under free trade. As mentioned above, this is always the case in our model with no factor endowment or factor intensity di¤erences. When these di¤erences are introduced, we derive an intuitive (and in our view empirically plausible) condition for capital to ‡ow from North to South. Namely, that in the free trade equilibrium, North operates the technology in the unconstrained sector at a higher capital-labor ratio than South does. In terms of the primitives of the model, this is the case as long as factor intensity di¤erences are small relative to capital-labor di¤erences across countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop our benchmark 2 2 model of …nancial frictions and compare the autarky and free trade equilibria. In section 3, we derive and discuss our main result on the complementarity between trade ‡ows and capital mobility. In section 4, we develop a dynamic version of our model that generalizes our complementarity result to the link between trade ‡ows and …nancial capital ‡ows. In section 5, we enrich the static model by incorporating Heckscher-Ohlin determinants of comparative advantage into the analysis. In section 6, we o¤er some concluding remarks.
A Stylized Model of Trade with Financial Frictions
In this section we develop our benchmark model. In order to isolate the main mechanism in the paper, we make a series of simplifying assumptions that we later relax sequentially. In particular, our benchmark model imposes a speci…c log-linear structure and abstracts from standard HeckscherOhlin determinants of comparative advantage. 6 This will be apparent in our parametric example with Cobb-Douglas production technologies. As mentioned in section 5 and Appendix A.2, the mapping between relative prices and capital-labor ratios becomes more complicated whenever the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is much smaller in the unconstrained sector than in the constrained sector. 7 The comparative statics of our extended model with Heckscher-Ohlin elements have some similarities with the speci…c-factors model of Jones (1971) and Samuelson (1971) . Although uninformed capital is not speci…c to the unconstrained sector, its allocation across sectors is pinned down by the parameters governing the tightness of the …nancial constraint. Amano (1977) , Brecher and Findlay (1983) , Jones (1989) and Neary (1995) study capital mobility within variants of the speci…c-factors model, but the conclusions generally depend on the assumed pattern of specialization and factor mobility.
The Environment
Consider an economy that employs two factors (capital K and labor L) to produce two goods (1 and 2). The country is inhabited by a continuum of measure of entrepreneurs (or informed capitalists), a continuum of measure 1 of uninformed capitalists, and a continuum of measure L of workers. All capitalists are endowed with K units of capital, so the aggregate capital-labor ratio of the economy is K=L, with a fraction of K being "informed" capital and the remaining fraction being "uninformed" capital.
All agents have identical Cobb-Douglas preferences and devote a fraction of their spending to sector 1's output, which we take as the numeraire:
Production in both sectors combines capital and labor according to:
where K i and L i are the amounts of capital employed in sector i. From a technological point of view, informed and uninformed capital are perfect substitutes. Notice also that, for the time being, we focus on symmetric technologies to isolate any source of comparative advantage other than …nancial development.
Goods and labor markets are perfectly competitive, and factors of production are freely mobile across sectors. If the capital market is also perfectly competitive, then the autarky equilibrium of this economy is straightforward to characterize. In particular, given identical technologies in both sectors, the marginal rate of transformation is equal to 1 and thus the relative price of sector 2's output is equal to 1, i.e., p = 1. It is then easily veri…ed that the economy allocates a fraction of K and L to sector 1, and the remaining fraction 1 to sector 2. If this frictionless economy is open to international trade and faces exogenously given relative prices p, then it completely specializes in sector 1 if p < 1 and completely specializes in sector 2 if p > 1.
Financial Friction
We shall assume, however, that the capital market is not frictionless. Consistently with the empirical literature discussed in the introduction, we assume that …nancial frictions have an asymmetric e¤ect in the two sectors. To simplify matters, we assume that …nancial contracting in sector 2 is perfect in the sense that producers in that sector can hire any desired amount of capital at the equilibrium rental rate .
Conversely, there is a …nancial friction in sector 1, which we associate with the production process in that sector as being relatively complex. In particular, production in that sector requires the "human capital" of entrepreneurs, but this same complexity of the production process implies that producers cannot borrow any desired amount of capital at a rate : We capture this capital market friction in a stark (though standard in the literature) way by assuming that lenders are only willing to lend to entrepreneurs a multiple 1 of the entrepreneur's capital endowment, so their investment is constrained by
For the purposes of this paper we need not take a particular stance on what exactly is the source of this borrowing constraint. It could be related to an ex-post moral hazard problem, to limited commitment or to the inalienability of human capital investments. 8
Regardless of the source of the constraint, it is clear that if is su¢ ciently large, then entrepreneurs are able to jointly allocate a fraction of capital to the constrained sector 1. In such a case, constraint (3) does not bind and the equilibrium is as described above. Hereafter, we focus on the more interesting case in which is low enough so that (3) binds. This requires:
Closed Economy Equilibrium
We next turn to explore the autarky equilibrium of this economy. As noted above, under Assumption 1 the …nancial constraint (3) binds, each entrepreneur invests an amount K (of which ( 1)K is borrowed), and the aggregate amount of capital allocated to sector 1 is: 9
Because labor can freely move across sectors, it is allocated to equate the value of its marginal product, which using (4) imposes
where, remember, p denotes the price of good 2 in terms of good 1 (the numeraire).
Together with goods market clearing
the labor market condition in (5) implies that
8 An important simplifying assumption in our setup is that the credit multiplier is independent of . Aghion, Banerjee and Piketty (1999) provide a microfoundation for this rental-rate insensitivity in a model with ex-post moral hazard and costly state veri…cation. See Tirole (2006) for a theoretical overview of di¤erent models of …nancial contracting. 9 This imposes that entrepreneurs invest all their endowment of K in sector 1. But this is necessarily a feature of the equilibrium since, as we will see shortly, they can always obtain a higher return in that sector.
where the inequality follows again from Assumption 1.
As indicated by equations (4) and (7), in our benchmark model …nancial frictions do not distort the allocation of labor across sectors but shift capital to the unconstrained sector (sector 2). As a result, sector 2's output is "oversupplied" and its relative price p is depressed.
Financial frictions also have signi…cant e¤ects on equilibrium factor prices. The rewards to labor and uninformed capital (in terms of the numeraire) are pinned down by their marginal products in the unconstrained sector, which using (8) yields:
and
Note that both w and are increasing functions of the degree of …nancial contractibility .
Other things equal, less …nancially developed economies feature depressed wages and depressed returns to uninformed capital.
The e¤ect of a fall in on the rental rate of uninformed capital is clear: the tighter borrowing constraint reduces the demand for this type of capital in the constrained sector, thus increasing the capital-labor ratio in the unconstrained sector and reducing its marginal product in terms of sector 2 output. 10 Because the relative price p is also increasing in , the rental falls not only in terms of sector 2's output but also in terms of sector 1's output.
In order to facilitate a comparison with the open economy results, it is useful to decompose the increase in the capital-labor ratio in sector 2 in three parts. The …rst e¤ect, which we label the "capital allocation e¤ ect," relates to the fact that a decrease in reduces the amount of capital that the constrained sector can absorb and thus increases the amount of capital employed in the unconstrained sector. Because capital and labor are complements in production, this shift in the allocation of capital induces a similar shift of labor from the constrained sector to the unconstrained sector: a "capital-labor complementarity e¤ ect." In our log-linear model, this second e¤ect is exactly cancelled by a "goods-market clearing e¤ ect": a decrease in leads to an increase in supply of sector 2's good, depresses its relative price p and induces labor to remain in sector 1 (see eq. (7)). Overall, we thus have that the capital-labor ratio increases in sector 2 because capital rises while labor stays constant.
The changes in sectoral capital-labor ratios are also crucial for understanding the e¤ects of on the remuneration of workers. Wages fall in terms of sector 1 output (the numeraire) because the capital-labor ratio in that sector is lower when is lower. By the same token, and since the capital-labor ratio rises in sector 2, we have that w=p rises with the decline in . All in all, however,
one can show that the real purchasing power of wages, that is w=p 1 , falls with a decline in . 11
This discussion also suggests that uninformed capital su¤ers disproportionately more from a low value of . In order to see this formally, notice that (9) and (10) imply that the wage-rental
is decreasing in . In sum, labor is hurt by the …nancial constraint but less so than capital because the capital-labor rises in sector 2, o¤setting the downward pressure on wages due the decline in p.
So far we have been silent on the return obtained by entrepreneurs (or informed capital). In the frictionless economy, informed and uninformed capital are perfect substitutes and both obtain a rental equal to . However, when the borrowing constraint (3) binds, informed capital becomes relatively scarce in sector 1 and entrepreneurs obtain a premium over the return of uninformed investors in that sector. In particular, their return per unit of capital is
where is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the …nancial constraint (3). 12 In equilibrium, the marginal product of capital in the constrained sector 1 needs to equal + , from which we obtain:
which is strictly positive (under Assumption 1) and also decreasing in . Hence, the shadow value of entrepreneurial capital is higher in economies with less developed …nancial markets. Note from (11), however, that this does not imply that the welfare of entrepreneurs is necessarily decreasing in .
Finally, because all agents in the economy share identical preferences, aggregate welfare is simply given by total income in terms of consumption units, that is
Using the expressions above, it is straightforward to check that U is proportional to w=p 1 , which as argued above is strictly increasing in . In sum, economies with more developed …nancial systems attain higher welfare levels. We summarize our results as follows:
Proposition 1 In the closed economy equilibrium, an increase in …nancial contractibility has the following e¤ ects: it raises the relative price of the unconstrained sector, the real return to uninformed capital, real wages, and welfare; it lowers the wage-rental ratio, and it has an ambiguous e¤ ect on entrepreneurial income.
1 1 This follows from the fact that w=p
, which is increasing in under Assumption 1. 1 2 The return R follows from R = ( + ) ( 1) .
Open Economy Equilibrium
Consider now a situation in which the economy we are studying, which we refer to as South, is open to international trade with the rest of the world (or North). For expositional simplicity, we focus for now on the case in which South is small, in the sense that it faces a …xed world relative price p.
As we will show below, our substantive implications do not depend on this assumption. We think of the rest of the world as having access to the same production technologies in (2) as South and also facing a …nancial friction, though smaller, in sector 1. For these reasons, it is natural to focus on a situation in which p < 1. Below, however, we brie ‡y discuss the case in which p 1.
As argued at the end of section 2.1, whenever p < 1, a frictionless small South would like to fully specialize in the production of good 1. Nevertheless, the borrowing constraint in that sector prevents this by limiting the aggregate allocation of capital to that sector to be no larger than K.
As a result, the distribution of capital across sectors is identical to that in the closed economy.
Conversely, the allocation of labor across sectors is a¤ected by the access to international trade in goods. Condition (5) equating the value of the marginal product of labor across sectors still needs to hold in equilibrium, but the allocation of labor no longer needs to be consistent with goods market clearing as dictated by equation (6) above. This is the distinguishing e¤ect of international trade in the model: it detaches the allocation of factors across sectors from local demand conditions.
Instead, South faces an exogenously given relative price p, and thus (5) immediately yields
The amount of labor allocated to the …nancially constrained sector 1 is decreasing in p and increasing in . Intuitively, a larger p raises the value of the marginal product of labor in sector 2 thus pulling labor away from sector 1. Similarly, a lower increases the amount of capital allocated to the unconstrained sector 2, thus again raising the marginal product of labor in that sector. When the world relative price p happens to coincide with South's autarky price (in equation (8)), then L 1 coincides as well with the autarky allocation, i.e., L 1 = L. But when international trade allows South to face a less depressed relative price p, South tilts the allocation of labor towards the unconstrained sector 2, thus specializing in the less "…nancially dependent" sector.
The equilibrium rewards to labor and uninformed capital are again pinned down by their marginal products in the unconstrained sector, which using (4) and (13) can be expressed as:
It is straightforward to verify that both w and are increasing functions of the relative price p. Intuitively, a larger p raises the incentive to shift resources to the unconstrained sector. This relaxes the …nancial constraint in sector 1, and consequently reduces the premium remuneration obtained by informed capital (entrepreneurs), and increases the remuneration of labor and capital in terms of sector 1's output. Formally, from the …rst order condition for capital in sector 1 we have (after replacing in it)
which is strictly decreasing in p. 13
In sum, by allowing South to specialize in the sector with lower …nancial frictions, international trade reduces the negative impact of …nancial underdevelopment on the rewards of labor and uninformed capital. 14 Note also that the wage-rental ratio
is strictly decreasing in the relative price p. This implies that an increase in p bene…ts uninformed capital more than workers. The logic is straightforward: as p rises, sector 1 releases labor but not capital to sector 2, so w= has to fall for sector 2 to absorb these new workers.
Given equations (14), (15), (16) and (17), we can also study the e¤ects of an improvement in …nancial contractibility, that is an increase in , on equilibrium factor prices. Remember that in the autarky equilibrium we established that w and were increasing in , while w= and were decreasing in . In the open economy equilibrium, it continues to be the case that w increases in and decreases with it.
In contrast to the closed economy, however, the return to uninformed capital is now decreasing in the level of …nancial contractibility. This surprising result comes as the outcome of two opposing e¤ects that we discussed in the closed-economy section. The …rst e¤ect is the direct "capital allocation e¤ ect": a decrease in shifts capital from the constrained to the unconstrained sector.
Holding constant the allocation of labor across sectors, this diminishes the marginal product of capital. But because of the second e¤ect, the "capital-labor complementarity e¤ ect," the allocation of labor is no longer independent of : in particular, a lower shifts labor from the constrained sector to the unconstrained sector. In the closed-economy equilibrium, this second e¤ect was exactly o¤set by the "goods-market clearing e¤ ect," but this is precisely the e¤ect that is absent in a small-
which is strictly decreasing in p. 1 4 Although, the decrease of the capital-labor ratio in sector 2 leads to a fall in the marginal product of labor in terms of that sectors' output (i.e., a fall of w=p), it is straightforward to show that real wages w=p 1 are strictly increasing in p. On the other hand, both and =p increase in p, so an increase in p necessarily raises the real return to uninformed capital. open economy equilibrium. Hence, we are left with the …rst two e¤ects and it is straightforward to show that the capital-labor complementarity e¤ect dominates the capital allocation e¤ect as long as the constrained sector operates at a lower capital-labor ratio than the unconstrained one. With symmetric technologies and …nancial constraints binding in the North, this is always true (see below for more on this) and the marginal product of capital is decreasing in . 15 We have thus shown that a small-open economy with a lower will feature lower wages but higher rates of return to capital. It then also follows that the wage-rental ratio will also be lower in small-open economies with underdeveloped …nancial markets, a result which again stands in sharp contrast to that obtained in the closed economy case.
Financially-Driven Comparative Advantage and Failure of FPE
In this section we study more systematically an equilibrium in which South can freely trade with a large North (or rest of the world). In order to isolate the role of …nancial development in shaping trade ‡ows, we assume that North is identical to South in every respect except for the level of …nancial development (and scale). We shall assume that
so that North is more …nancially developed. As a result, we can use the analysis in section 2.3 to conclude that this large, …nancially developed North, pins down the following world relative price
Note that because p N < 1, both North and South produce both goods in equilibrium. The more developed …nancial system in North implies, however, that South has a comparative disadvantage in the constrained sector 1. Using equations (2), (14), (15), (16) and (18), we can express imports of sector 1's output in South as
where the sign follows from N > S .
Despite the fact that there is diversi…cation in production, factor price equalization does not attain, as factor prices were shown above to depend on the particular level of …nancial development in the corresponding region. Furthermore, from the derivations above, we necessarily have the following result:
Proposition 2 In the free trade equilibrium, South produces both goods and is a net importer of the "…nancially dependent" good 1. Furthermore, free trade does not result in factor price equalization and leads to
The results on the ranking of factor prices simply follow from the comparative statics with respect to derived in the previous section. North and South share a common relative price p, but South features a lower . Hence, relative to North, it must allocate a disproportionate amount of labor to sector 2, it must have a relatively lower wage rate, and it must feature a relatively larger return to informed and uninformed capital.
Even though we explore a generalized version of our model later in the paper, it is useful to discuss brie ‡y here the source and generality of the ranking of factor prices derived in Proposition 2. Remember that in the closed economy equilibrium we derived the result that both w and were decreasing in , which implies that without international trade, we would necessarily have w N > w S and N > S . With free trade, this can never be the case. Because both North and South produce good 2 in equilibrium, we must have that for a general neoclassical unit cost function in sector 2,
where c 2 ( ) is increasing in both arguments. Hence, it must be the case that either w S > w N or S > N . On the other hand, for a general constant returns to scale technology in sector 2, we must also have that
where
Equations (19) and (20) combined imply that the ranking of factor prices necessarily is as derived in Proposition 2 provided that North operates the technology in the unconstrained sector 2 at a higher capital-labor ratio than South does. As explained above, in our benchmark model, this happens because North specializes in the constrained sector 1, which operates at an ine¢ ciently low capital-labor ratio.
It is straightforward to show that this result continues to hold for arbitrary symmetric production functions featuring constant returns and diminishing marginal products. In such a case, the analog of equation (5) is
where F L ( ) denotes the marginal product of labor and F 0 L ( ) > 0. As shown in Appendix A.2., for general homothetic preferences and symmetric production functions, it continues to be the case that p < 1 as long as the …nancial constraint binds in North. From equation (21), this immediately
, namely that capital intensity is lower in the constrained sector 1. Furthermore, whenever
Because aggregate relative factor endowments are identical in both countries, it must then be the
is larger in North than South. The previous argument con…rms the general validity of the results in Proposition 2 in environments where heterogeneity in …nancial development across countries and heterogeneity in …nancial dependence across sectors are the driving forces shaping international trade ‡ows. Interestingly enough, even when we allow for other determinants of trade ‡ows in section 5 below, the results continue to hold for general asymmetric production functions provided that North is su¢ ciently capital abundant relative to South.
So far we have focused on comparing the equilibrium in North and South. Using the results in section 2.4, we can also study the e¤ects of trade integration for South. This amounts to a comparing the autarky and free trade equilibria in South, which is analogous to describing the e¤ects of an increase in the relative price p in the small open economy equilibrium. As argued above, this increase raises wages and the return to uninformed capital, but reduces the return to entrepreneurial capital. Overall, however, aggregate welfare in South is necessarily higher in the free trade equilibrium. As shown in Appendix A.2., all these results continue to hold if we relax our Cobb-Douglas assumptions and assume general homothetic preferences and general symmetric production functions with constant returns to scale and diminishing marginal products. 16 2.6 Trade Integration with a Frictionless North or a "Not-So-Large" North Let us now pause to discuss some aspects of North in our analysis. First, we have focused on the case in which North sets a world relative price p lower than 1. This is the natural case to consider in a world in which countries are fully symmetric except for …nancial development and the inequality N < (analogous to Assumption 1) holds. Suppose instead that …nancial contracting in North is not a constraint so that N > . Then, North features a value of equal to 0 and sets a world relative price of p = 1. In the free trade equilibrium, South again specializes in the unconstrained sector, but trade brings about factor price equalization. In this case, free trade again raises the equilibrium values of w and , but the rental rate of uninformed capital in South does not "overshoot" that in North. 17 Henceforth, we continue with the case where the …nancial constraint is binding in North.
Second, we treated North as a large enough country to …x world prices at p N in equation 1 6 Although Southern wages in terms of sector 1 output always increase with p, once we relax our Cobb-Douglas assumption, the purchasing power of these wages may or may not increase in p depending on demand patterns. 1 7 The case in which the North sets a relative price higher than 1 can be studied analogously. The South completely specializes in sector 2, which necessarily implies = 0. Factor prices are pinned down by their marginal values in sector 2. In that case, however, factor prices depend on Southern variables, so factor price equalization generally fails. The direction of failure generally depends on the exact source of the relative price p > 1 in North.
(18). Suppose instead that both North and South are large enough to impact world prices. The equilibrium is identical to that of two "small" open economies facing a common relative price p, with the additional restriction that p should ensure goods-market clearing at the world level :
It is straightforward to see that an increase in S raises p and thus the overall e¤ect of an increase in S on factor prices is a combination of the e¤ects we isolated in the autarky case and those we isolated in the small open economy case. Nevertheless, it is apparent that it continues to be the case that, in the free trade equilibrium, all the statements in Proposition 2 continue to hold. The reason is that both countries share a common p in equilibrium, and thus cross-sectional comparisons still follow from studying the comparative statics with respect to holding p constant. Importantly, it also continues to be the case that trade integration increases wages and the return to uninformed capital in South. To see this, note that for N > S , the world relative price satis…es
and thus from the point of view of South, trade integration corresponds to an increase in the relative price p (holding S constant). Importantly, all these conclusions remain valid even after relaxing our assumptions of Cobb-Douglas preferences and technology.
An advantage of considering the case of a "not-so-large" North is that trade integration now also has non-negligible e¤ects in that country. From the above discussion, we have that trade integration has an e¤ect analogous to lowering p in the small open economy studied above. As a result, w and fall in North, but it can be shown that (with Cobb-Douglas preferences) w=p 1 increases, so that workers in both North and South bene…t from trade liberalization. Finally, it can be shown that, overall, North also gains from trade liberalization.
Trade and Capital Mobility as Complements
As usual in international trade theory, we have studied so far scenarios in which goods can freely move across countries, but factors of production cannot. In this section, we consider the implications of allowing for physical capital mobility. Following the lead of Mundell (1957) , we study the interaction of capital mobility and trade integration by comparing the incentives for capital mobility with and without trade frictions.
Capital Mobility with Prohibitive Trade Frictions
Consider …rst the case with trade frictions. In particular, consider a situation in which trade in the numeraire sector 1 is costless, but trade costs in sector 2 are prohibitive. Without capital mobility, the equilibrium is then as described in section 2.3 above. With free trade in just one good, South cannot specialize in its comparative advantage sector and the equilibrium is identical to the autarkic one. From equation (10), it is then clear that in such a case we necessarily have N > S . In words, despite both countries sharing the same aggregate capital-labor ratio, the marginal product of capital is higher in North than in South.
If we then allow for physical capital mobility, capital initially ‡ows from South to North. The counterpart of this instantaneous ‡ow of capital is the future sequence of positive net imports of good 1 in South equal to the interest payments of the capital stock exported from South to North. 18 To see this formally, notice that the share F S!N =K of South's capital stock that needs to ‡ow to North in order to ensure that S in equation (10) converges up to the (una¤ected) Northern rental N is given by
.
The larger the di¤erence in …nancial contractibility, the larger that share should be. 19 South then features perpetual net imports of good 1 in an amount
This result bears some resemblance to those derived in the literature arguing that …nancial frictions may help explain the Lucas (1990) paradox (Gertler and Rogo¤, 1990 , Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002 , Reinhart and Rogo¤, 2004 , Kraay et al., 2005 . To the extent that capital-scarce countries also are …nancially underdeveloped, our closed-economy equilibrium can help rationalize why capital does not ‡ow to those countries.
Notice that we have restricted our analysis to allowing for mobility of uninformed capital.
Because the return to informed capital varies across countries, there might be incentive for that capital to move as well. If, however, we make the reasonable assumption that entrepreneurs have to reside in the country where their projects are run, then our emphasis on uninformed capital mobility is a natural one. Our stylized model simply captures the fact that machines are relatively less costly to move internationally than human beings. In the conclusion we brie ‡y discuss the main implications that follow from allowing for mobility of informed capital in our framework.
Capital Mobility with No Trade Frictions
We next consider the case in which there is free trade in both goods. Conceptually, this is analogous to considering a situation in which there is substantial heterogeneity in …nancial dependence across the set of goods that are traded in world markets. The equilibrium without physical capital mobility we derived above then indicates that S > N : even though both countries feature the same aggregate-capital labor ratio, the return to capital is higher in South. It then follows that if we allow for physical capital mobility, capital moves from North to South. Using equations (10) and 1 8 The assumption that interest payments are settled in sector 1 output is not important. In the case in which sector 2 prices are equalized, we still obtain that the rental rate for uninformed capital is lower in South in autarky. The reason for this is that in autarky both and =p are increasing in .
1 9 If South is large enough, this (physical) capital ‡ow has a non-negligible e¤ect on the rental rate N in North. In such a case, the required capital ‡ow F continues to be increasing in N = S but it is quantitatively smaller (relative to South's capital).
(18), the exact capital ‡ow required to ensure rental rate equalization is now given by
, and again vanishes to 0 when S ! N . Importantly, because the capital ‡ow makes both countries share a common relative price p and a common rental rate , wages w and the shadow price are also equalized across countries. Hence, as in the classical Heckscher-Ohlin-Mundell model, free good and factor mobility lead to factor price equalization. The main di¤erence is that our model requires both types of mobility for equalization to take place.
Our results show that, from the point of view of South, trade integration and capital in ‡ows are complements. Only when trade is su¢ ciently free, does allowing for capital mobility lead to a capital in ‡ow into South. It is interesting to note that this complementarity is reinforced by the fact that the capital in ‡ow into South further increases trade ‡ows between North and South. In particular,
we can easily show that capital mobility increases consumption but reduces production of good 1 in South. To see this formally, note …rst that because the allocation of capital to the constrained sector in South is bounded above by S K, Northern capital ‡owing to South is necessarily employed in sector 2. On the other hand, because capital mobility leads to equalization of wages (and thus the marginal product of labor), we also have that
which can be shown to be strictly lower than the Southern allocation of labor to sector 1 without capital ‡ows. 20 This implies that production of sector 1's output in South falls. On the other hand, consumption in that sector is proportional to income, and capital mobility ensures that Southern income converges up to the level of Northern income. 21 Given these results, we can safely conclude that capital mobility leads to an increase in trade ‡ows between North and South.
This complementarity between trade ‡ows and capital mobility in our model is in sharp contrast with the substitutability present in the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model. As shown by Mundell (1957) , in that model trade frictions generate incentives for capital to ‡ow into the capital-scarce South, while a move toward free trade leads to factor price equalization and therefore eliminates the incentive for capital to move across countries. Even when trade does not fully equalize factor prices, trade integration will induce a convergence of factor prices and will reduce the incentive for capital to move across countries. Hence, in the Heckscher-Ohlin-Mundell world, trade and capital 2 0 Without capital mobility, we had
where the inequality follows from > N > S . 2 1 The fact that the convergence is upwards follows from the fact that, in the small-open-economy equilibrium, income in South is increasing in the relative price p, and North features a higher relative price p N > p. mobility are substitutes. 22
Capital Mobility with Intermediate Trade Frictions
The above results suggest that the real e¤ects of allowing for capital mobility crucially depend on the extent of trade integration. In this section we brie ‡y formalize this insight by considering cases with intermediate trade frictions. In order to do so, we again maintain the assumption that the numeraire good 1 is freely tradable, but that good 2 is subject to an iceberg transport cost such that a fraction 2 (0; 1) of the good is lost in transit. Because in equilibrium South exports good 2, this is formally equivalent to North levying a tari¤ on Southern imports.
Given our assumption that South is a small open economy, the trade friction amounts to Southern producers facing relative prices equal to p N (1 ) rather than p N . 23 As long as
the trade friction is not prohibitive and it continues to be the case that South is a net exporter of sector 2's output. Values of between 0 and 1 p S aut =p N represent levels of trade integration that fall in between the autarky and free trade levels.
Because the trade friction has a monotonic e¤ect on the relative price p faced by South, and because the rental rate to uninformed capital is increasing in this relative price p, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 3 There exists a unique level of trade frictions 2 0; 1 p S aut =p N such that for < we have N < S , while for > we have N > S . Consequently, (physical) capital migrates South when < and North if > .
Proposition 3 summarizes the sense in which trade and capital mobility are complements in our model. The particular value for the threshold integration level cannot be derived in closed form, but applying the implicit function theorem to (15), we can conclude that @ =@ S < 0. In words, the lower is …nancial development in South, the lower is the amount of trade integration needed to ensure that capital ‡ows into South when allowing for capital mobility.
Finally it is worth mentioning that with positive trade frictions, it is no longer the case that trade integration and free physical capital mobility necessarily lead to factor price equalization.
Even when the direction of capital ‡ows is from North to South, the presence of trade frictions ensures that wages in South remain depressed.
2 2 Another interesting distinction between our result and Mundell's is that, without trade integration, physical capital mobility leads to a divergence in wage levels rather than a convergence, as wages in South are further depressed by the capital out ‡ow. With free trade and physical capital mobility our model generates factor price equalization and the capital in ‡ow pushes Southern wages up to the Northern level.
2 3 This is true regardless of which sector's output is costlessly traded. If the trade friction was in sector 1, then Southern consumers would have to pay a price 1= (1 ) when importing the good (since Northern producers can obtain a price of 1 in North). The relative price of sector 2's output would again be p N (1 ). By modeling the net capital ‡ows implications of our view, we are able to connect with the "global imbalances" literature, which attempts to explain the large capital ‡ows from South to North observed in recent years. The main conclusion that emerges from the analysis below is that protectionism, an increasingly likely political reaction in North, could exacerbate rather than alleviate these "imbalances" if …nancial factors are important determinants of trade patterns. 25
Trade and Financial Capital Flows as Complements

A Dynamic Extension
Consider the following dynamic extension of our model, which essentially integrates the single-good framework of Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2006) with the trade model in the previous sections.
Time evolves continuously. In…nitesimal agents are born at a rate per unit time and die at the same rate; population mass is constant and equal to L. All agents are endowed with one unit of labor services which they supply inelastically to the market. 26 Intertemporal preferences are such that agents save all their income and consume only when they die (exit). 27 Instantaneous utility at the time of death is given by (1). Physical capital is tradable and is the only store of value. We assume that the initial stock of capital is equal to K and we rule out any capital depreciation or accumulation.
Entrepreneurs are born as such, and at any given instant they constitute a share of the population. As in the static model, they naturally specialize in sector 1. Entrepreneurial rents are not capitalizable (i.e., they cannot be used as store of value). 28 Moreover, in the main text we assume that these rents are taxed away and distributed back to the population at large as a lump sum. The reason for this assumption is to avoid having to track the wealth dynamics of two di¤erent groups within each country and the feedback of these di¤erential dynamics on factor prices. We show in Appendix A.1, where we develop the full model without taxation, that none of our main results in this section depends on this simpli…cation.
At any point in time, factor prices are determined exactly as in the static model developed above. Nevertheless, in this dynamic model physical capital plays a dual role as a productive factor and also as a store of value. To the extent that claims on this store of value are allowed to be traded across borders, this dynamic model generates an alternative source of capital ‡ows across countries. Importantly, the key price that determines the direction of these capital ‡ows is not the rental rate , but rather the interest rate r in each country before opening the capital account.
This interest rate di¤ers from the static marginal product of capital, , because the value of a unit of capital need not be one in equilibrium (since capital is …xed) and there could be expected capital gains or losses. We turn next to the determination of interest rates.
Let V j t denote the value of the stock of capital in country j = N; S at any instant t. The return on holding K units of capital is equal to the dividend price ratio j K=V j t plus the capital gain
Let W j t denote the savings accumulated by agents in country j up to date t. Savings decrease with withdrawals (deaths), and increase with labor, entrepreneurial income and the return on accumulated savings:
With a closed capital account, it must be the case that savings equal to the value of the capital stock at all points in time:
Replacing (24) into (22), and using (23), we have that
Factor prices are still determined by the static conditions in earlier sections, and hence they are time invariant. It follows that _ W j t = _ V j t = 0 and the equilibrium interest rate (also time invariant) is given by:
If the …nancial friction is not binding, it follows directly from the symmetric Cobb-Douglas assumption in (2) that r j = . This is an upper bound for the interest rate in the economies we consider.
Let us now reintroduce the binding …nancial friction. Consider …rst the case in which North and South are closed to international trade. Plugging equations (9), (10), and (12) into (25) yields
The autarkic interest rate is thus an increasing function of , which implies that South experiences a capital out ‡ow if it integrates to global capital markets when trade frictions are large. This is the result highlighted by Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2006) .
The low interest rate in South re ‡ects the limited availability of assets to satisfy the local store of value demand. The reason there are few assets is that the share of output received by uninformed capital, the only capitalizable income, is depressed by the …nancial friction which pushes uninformed capital toward the unconstrained sector and depresses the price of that good.
We can contrast the autarky result with the polar opposite case where trade is frictionless.
Plugging equations (14), (15), and (16) into (25) yields
which is now decreasing in . That is, South experiences capital in ‡ows if it integrates to global capital markets.
The result that the interest rate is higher in South than in North is tightly related to our previous "overshooting" result regarding the rental rate of capital. Intuitively, by specializing in the unconstrained sector, uninformed capital works with a disproportionate amount of labor in economies with lower credit multipliers. As a result, a larger share of capital income is in the form of capitalizable "uninformed capital income" and the supply of store of value, relative to its demand, is higher. Conversely, by specializing in the …nancially dependent sector, a …nancially developed country raises the reward of entrepreneurs (who now employ more workers), thereby reducing the share of capitalizable income in total income.
As in the case of physical capital mobility, the crucial di¤erence between the autarky case and the free trade case is that the "goods-market clearing e¤ect" is operative in the former case, but not in the latter. We next turn to studying intermediate levels of openness, which corresponds to situations with varying incidence of the goods-market clearing e¤ect.
An Application: Protectionism Back…res
The current "global imbalances" have rekindled protectionist proposals. The direct logic behind these proposals is that by raising trade barriers in North, the magnitude of trade surpluses in South must decline. We argue in this section that if the current scenario is an equilibrium response to heterogenous degrees of …nancial development across the world, protectionism may exacerbate rather than reduce the imbalances.
The main reason behind our conclusion is that the pre-integration North-South interest rate spread rises with trade frictions. In order to see this, we extend the interest rate expression in (26) to cases of intermediate levels of trade frictions. As in section 3.3, we consider situations in which sector 1's output can be freely tradable, while a fraction 2 (0; 1) of sector 2's output melts in transit when shipped across countries. As a result, the relative price in South is p N (1 ) and the interest rate in each country becomes:
It is clear from inspection that, for a given p N , the di¤erence r N r S is strictly increasing in .
Furthermore, we have that:
Proposition 4 There exists a unique level of trade frictions~ 2 0; 1 p S aut =p N such that for <~ we have r N < r S , while for >~ we have r N > r S . Consequently, …nancial capital migrates South when <~ and North if >~ .
This result is analogous to Proposition 3, but it now applies to …nancial capital instead of physical capital. 29 Suppose that the initial level of trade frictions is 0 ~ so that r N r S . Then …nancial integration leads to capital out ‡ows from South to North, a situation that captures the current scenario between emerging Asia and the U.S. We now want to compare the impact of …nancial integration for di¤erent values of trade friction ~ . It is clear from the above discussion that the larger is , the larger is the gap r N r S . We next show that a larger may also be associated with larger current account surpluses in South.
Notice that …nancial integration does not a¤ect factor prices and thus the value of production in South. Hence, impact changes on the current account follow one-to-one from impact changes in consumption. In our dynamic model, consumption in any instant is simply given by W j t , since a fraction of agents die and consume their wealth. How does …nancial integration a¤ect wealth in South? Note that before opening the capital account we have
Right after opening up the capital account, the interest rate jumps from r S to r N and we have
In sum, …nancial integration leads to a fall in wealth in the South, to reduced consumption, and 2 9 Interestingly, we can also show that~ . In words, the required level of trade openess to attract …nancial capital ‡ows is lower than that required to attract physical capital ‡ows. Hence, a liberalizing country should …rst experience …nancial capital in ‡ows and only later physical capital in ‡ows. Formally, this follows from the fact that interest rates are proportional to j K=Y j . Hence, at =~ , we have that r S = r N but still S < N , since income is lower in South.
to a current account surplus on impact. The fall in wealth is given by
An alternative way to interpret the result is that the ratio q S = V S =K S , which measures the price of a unit of capital in South, falls on impact when South …nancially integrates with North. This decline in the value of domestic capital yields a negative wealth e¤ect that reduces consumption in
South and generates a current account surplus.
We can now compare the impact e¤ect of …nancial integration for di¤erent values of . Notice that straightforward di¤erentiation yields:
It is then apparent that for ~ (i.e., r N r S ), the capital loss in South worsens with a rise in protectionism. This in turn exacerbates the trade surplus recorded in South following …nancial integration. 30 That is, protectionism back…res.
In our derivations we have treated South as small relative to North, but it should be apparent that our substantive results do not depend on this assumption. The main signi…cant di¤erence is that, in the two-large region model, …nancial integration also reduces the interest rate in North, thus creating a positive wealth e¤ect that induces North to increase consumption on impact and increase their trade de…cit vis à vis South.
An Application and Extension: High Saving Rate in Regions of South
The implication that regions in South that are more open to trade are more prone to receive net capital in ‡ows may appear as counterfactual when comparing Asia and Latin America. The economies in the former region are at least as open as those in the latter, but they typically run current account surpluses that are signi…cantly larger than those of Latin American economies.
However, there is no contradiction once one also considers that Asian economies have much higher saving rates.
Our dynamic model is ‡exible enough to accommodate such situations. In particular, suppose that South is split between high and low saving regions -for example, Asia and Latin America, respectively. Because consumption in any instant is equal to a fraction of wealth, a natural way to capture this di¤erent propensity to consume is to have S;Asia < N < S;LA :
3 0 Note that an increase in trade frictions may reduce the trade surplus in the South when the initial trade friction is already very signi…cant. The reason for this result is that, in such case, S is so depressed that W S does not have much space to fall as a result of …nancial integration. 
A Heckscher-Ohlin-Mundell Extension
Our benchmark model isolates the e¤ects of cross-country and cross-sectoral heterogeneity in …nan-cial frictions on the structure of trade and capital ‡ows. In this section, we introduce HeckscherOhlin determinants of international trade into the analysis. The purpose of this extension is twofold.
On the one hand, we seek to explore the robustness of our results to more general speci…cations of preferences and technology. On the other hand, we want to study how the standard results of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Mundell model are modi…ed by the presence of imperfect capital markets.
As in the previous sections, we begin by developing a highly parameterized version of the model.
In Appendix A.2, we develop a model with general functional forms, in the spirit of the classical treatments of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Mundell model.
Environment
The model is a simple extension of our benchmark static model. We allow production technologies to di¤er in (primitive) factor intensity and endow countries with di¤erent relative endowments (that is, di¤erent aggregate capital-labor ratios). For simplicity, we continue to assume Cobb-Douglas preferences and technologies, but we now allow for a larger output elasticity of capital in sector 1:
In words, we assume that there is a positive cross-industry correlation between (primitive) capital intensity and frictions in …nancial contracting. This speci…cation is consistent with available data. 32
The frictionless, closed-economy equilibrium of this two-sector model is straightforward to characterize. For our purposes, it su¢ ces to indicate at this point that the economy would allocate an amount
of capital to sector 1. For …nancial frictions to bind, we hence now require:
Closed Economy Equilibrium
As in our benchmark model, under Assumption 1'the …nancial constraint binds and equalization of the value marginal product of labor imposes
We combine this condition with goods market clearing
to obtain
As in our benchmark model, the allocation of labor across sectors is identical to that in the case without …nancial frictions. Combined with the fact that the economy allocates an ine¢ ciently large amount of capital to sector 2, we again obtain that good 2 is oversupplied and its relative price is depressed.
The result that the allocation of labor across sectors is invariant to the level of …nancial frictions depends on our assumption of Cobb-Douglas preferences and technology. Nevertheless, as shown in Appendix A.2, the result that the relative price p is increasing in holds for arbitrary neoclassical production functions and homothetic preferences.
An important di¤erence between the present model and our benchmark one is that relative factor endowments generates cross-country variation in the relative price p. In particular, a labor abundant, …nancially underdeveloped South features a relatively lower p, not only because of …-nancial frictions but also because sector 2 is labor intensive and autarky wages in labor abundant countries are, ceteris paribus, lower. 33 We next turn to describing the equilibrium factor prices of this closed economy equilibrium.
The rewards to labor and uninformed capital are pinned down by their marginal products in the unconstrained sector, which using (28) yields
As in our benchmark economy, both w and are increasing in …nancial development , but the e¤ect on is disproportionate, in the sense that
is decreasing in . The intuition for these results is analogous to that in our benchmark economy.
Suppose now that the world consists of two economies, North and South, that di¤er not only in …nancial development, but also in their relative factor endowments. North features a larger value of and also a larger capital-labor ratio K=L. We consider …rst the case of limited trade in which countries can only trade in the numeraire sector.
Given limited trade, in which direction does physical capital ‡ow? Our benchmark model suggests that the larger level of in North implies that N > S , and capital ‡ows from South to
North. The Heckscher-Ohlin model instead predicts that, in autarky, the lower K=L in South leads to N < S and capital ‡ows from North to South.
Since this extended model incorporates both e¤ects, it is not surprising that the direction of capital ‡ows is now ambiguous. To illustrate this, we can log-di¤erentiate equation (30) to obtain
where hats denote proportional di¤erences. The …rst term re ‡ects the e¤ect identi…ed in our benchmark model. The second term relates to the standard Heckscher-Ohlin e¤ect, which is at the core of Mundell's prediction that trade frictions foster capital in ‡ows into the capital-scarce South.
We summarize our result as follows:
Provided that di¤ erences in capitallabor ratios are small relative to di¤ erences in …nancial contractibility, with limited trade, capital ‡ows from South to North.
Open Economy Equilibrium
Consider now the case in which South is small and thus faces exogenous relative prices p. We again focus on the case in which North shares the same preferences and technologies as South and N satis…es Assumption 1'. This ensures that South does not specialize in the unconstrained sector and allocates an amount K of capital to sector 1. 34 As in our benchmark model, the allocation of labor across sectors is now uniquely pinned down by the condition equating the value of the marginal product of labor in the two sectors:
(1 1 )
Although equation (31) does not provide a closed form solution for L 1 , it is straightforward to see that, just as in the benchmark economy, L 1 is decreasing in p and increasing in . When South opens up to trade with a North that pins down a higher relative price p, South specializes in the labor-intensive sector, where …nancial frictions are lower. Notice that North pins down a higher relative price p not only because of the e¤ect isolated in the benchmark model, but also because its larger capital-labor ratio is associated with a larger price of the labor-intensive good.
Letting 1 L 1 =L, we can next write wages and the rental rate of uninformed capital as a function of this endogenous variable
3 4 If N is large enough, then South specializes in sector 2 to the point at which …nancial constraints cease to bind. In such a case, the model behaves as the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model and, if K S =L S is large enough, factor price equalization attains. As we will see later, however, even in this case trade integration raises the Southern rental rate S relative to the Northern one. This is in sharp contrast to the result obtained in the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model.
Because 1 is decreasing in p, it follows that both w and are increasing functions of p, regardless of di¤erences in factor intensity and factor abundance. This implies that as in the HeckscherOhlin model, trade integration raises wages (in terms of the numeraire) in the capital-scarce South.
Nevertheless, contrary to the standard model, the real return to uninformed capital also goes up as a result of trade integration. Even more surprisingly, using (31), (32) and (33), the ratio w= can be written as w = (1 2 ) (1 )
which is decreasing in p, since 1 is decreasing in p. In words, although trade integration raises wages, it raises the rental rate of capital even more. A necessary implication of this result is that, with trade opening, Southern wages increase in terms of the numeraire, but decrease relative to sector 2's prices. Using Jones'(1965) hat algebra, we havê
where hats denote percentage changes. This contrasts with the ranking dictated by the Stolper-
In summary, we have derived the following anti-Stolper-Samuelson proposition:
Proposition 6 (Anti-Stolper-Samuelson) Regardless of di¤ erences in factor intensity and relative factor abundance, trade integration with a more …nancially developed and capital abundant
North reduces the wage-rental ratio in South. As a result, the rental rate increases relative to the price of both sectors, while wages increase relative to the price of the import sector, but fall relative to the price of the export sector.
The intuition for this result is analogous to that in the benchmark model. Regardless of relative factor intensities, as p rises, sector 1 releases labor but not capital to sector 2, so w= has to adjust downwards to decrease its capital intensity.
This result bears some resemblance to the result in a speci…c factors model in which capital is sector speci…c but labor can move across sectors. As is well understood, in that type of model, trade integration increases the real reward of the capital speci…c to that sector, while having an ambiguous e¤ect on real wages. 35 In our model, uninformed capital is not sector-speci…c, but the rents obtained by informed capital are sector-speci…c and this explains the similar predictions that emerge in both models.
Direction of Capital Flows
So far we have focused on studying the e¤ects of trade integration in South, which correspond to studying an increase in the relative price p. Next we explore the relative factor prices in North and South, from which we learn the (desired) direction of capital ‡ows in the free trade equilibrium.
This analysis amounts to characterizing the comparative statics with respect to and K=L, given that both North and South share the same relative price p and are identical in all other dimensions.
Simple log-di¤erentiation of equations (32) and (33) delivers:
where remember that 1 is the share of labor allocated to sector 1.
These equations illustrate that the country with the larger capital-labor ratio (North) features a relatively higher wage and lower rental rate of capital. This is consistent with the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model outside the factor price equalization set.
Furthermore, provided that 1 > , the larger in North contributes further to ensuring that the rental rate in South settles at a higher level than that in North:
S > N . In our benchmark model, this was the only e¤ect at play. There, we had that 1 = and > necessarily held in an economy where …nancial frictions bind. In our more general model, the condition 1 > may fail to hold if 1 is su¢ ciently larger than 2 . 36
Still, even when 1 < , our analysis suggests that large enough di¤erences in K=L always ensure that S > N . How large need di¤erences in K=L be? Our exposition following Proposition 2 in section 2.5 suggested a simple (and in our view plausible) condition that ensures that S > N , namely that North operates sector 2's technology at a higher capital-labor ratio than South does.
Discussion
In our benchmark model, we derived the result that the di¤erence integration. In sum, in this extended model it continues to be the case that trade and capital ‡ows are complements rather than substitutes.
The key conditions that ensure this result are that (i) South features a depressed relative price p in the closed-economy equilibrium, and that (ii) in the free trade equilibrium, the rental rate of uninformed capital in South is increasing in the relative price p. We showed above that these two conditions are satis…ed whenever preferences and technologies are Cobb-Douglas. In Appendix A.2, we show that condition (ii) continues to be satis…ed for general neoclassical production functions and homothetic preferences. This is related to the "full" generality of our anti-Stolper-Samuelson result in Proposition 6. As for condition (i), we show in Appendix A.2. that it is also generally satis…ed, except for situations in which the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is much smaller in the unconstrained sector than in the constrained sector and North-South di¤erences in capital abundance are large relative to di¤erences in …nancial development.
Given these results, we conclude that our model delivers a robust complementarity between trade ‡ows and capital mobility.
Final Remarks
The main message of this paper is that when variation in …nancial development and …nancial dependence are signi…cant determinants of comparative advantage, trade and capital ‡ows become complements in …nancially underdeveloped countries. This complementarity is in sharp contrast to the substitutability that arises in the standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Mundell framework, and has important practical implications. For example, it says that deepening trade liberalization in South raises this country's ability to attract foreign capital. At the global level, it implies that protectionist policies aimed at reducing the so called "global imbalances" may back…re and exacerbate them.
And while we do not analyze the normative aspects of liberalization processes, our framework hints that it is important for developing economies to liberalize trade before the capital account, if capital out ‡ows are to be averted.
Our complementarity result follows from the fact that trade liberalization allows an allocation of labor to sectors that is independent of local demand conditions. As a result, a …nancially underdeveloped country is able to allocate a disproportionate amount of workers in sectors in which …nancial frictions are less severe, thereby increasing the marginal product of capital. Although we initially derived this result for the case in which South is a small open economy and preferences and technologies are Cobb-Douglas, we later demonstrated that the result is general. In particular, in a world in which countries di¤er only in …nancial development and sectors di¤er only in …nancial dependence, trade integration necessarily reduces (and may overturn) the gap between the real return to capital in North and South. Furthermore, even after introducing Heckscher-Ohlin determinants of trade, our complementarity result continues to hold under weak conditions.
In order to keep our analysis focused, we only allowed physical and …nancial capital to ‡ow across borders. Our framework can however easily accommodate mobility of informed capital.
Remember that in our benchmark model, the shadow value of entrepreneurial capital is larger in South than in North, that is S > N . If we allowed them to do so, Northern entrepreneurs might want to migrate to South to run projects there (and they would surely want to if they could borrow a multiple N 1 of their endowment when producing in South). We leave this issue for future work but point at two immediate and related implications of allowing for this sort of mobility. First, in contrast to the case of uninformed capital, "informed capital" migrates to the import-competing, …nancially dependent sector in South rather than to its export sector. As a result, informed capital ‡ows are trade-reducing rather than trade-enhancing. Second, trade integration tends to generate a convergence in the value of across countries, and thus the incentives for informed capital to ‡ow across countries are reduced by trade integration. These two e¤ects jointly suggest that informed capital mobility and trade are substitutes not complements.
Furthermore, as in the main text, the interest rate is given by
Notice that whenever j ! 0, the share of wealth in the hands of entrepreneurs converges to , just as in the static model. With j > 0, the higher entrepreneurial income translates into a steady state entrepreneurial share of wealth~ that is larger than . Importantly, this share~ is a function of factor prices (as indicated by equation (39)), and thus it will vary depending on whether the economy is open to international trade or not. Similarly, in the static model factor prices were a¤ected by the share of wealth (capital) in the hands of entrepreneur. These interactions between equilibrium factor prices and the tightness of the …nancial constraint complicate the analysis, but as illustrated below the analysis remains tractable.
Closed Economy Equilibrium
Consider …rst the static closed economy equilibrium. From equations (38) and (39), and using the fact that r j t q j t = j t in steady state, the share of wealth (and capital) in the hands of entrepreneurs is given bỹ
where we have dropped country superscripts and time subscripts for simplicity. It is clear that whenever > 0, we have~ > . This may suggest that Assumption 1 is no longer su¢ cient to ensure that …nancial constraints bind in the steady state. Note however that if we had~ > > , then the …rst inequality would imply = 0 and~ = , thus contradicting the second inequality. Hence, we must have either <~ < or~ = > . Assumption 1 then su¢ ces to ensure that the …rst of these cases applies. Next, from equations (10) and (12), we have that in the autarky equilibrium, the ratio = is given by
where we have replaced with~ , since the fraction of the capital stock in the hands of entrepreneurs is now given by~ , not . On the other hand, from equation (40), the ratio r= is given by j K=Y j . Using equations (9), (10) and (12) with~ replacing , we obtain:
where again~ is replacing . Plugging (42) and (43) into (41) then yields:
which implicitly de…nes~ as a function of and other parameter values. This expression is cumbersome, but in order to study the e¤ects of …nancial development on the variables of interest (wages, rental rates, interest rates...), it su¢ ces to study how ~ varies with .
Multiplying both sides of (44) by and rearranging we can implicitly de…ne as a function of .
We next show that is increasing in . Since the left-hand-side of (45) is decreasing in , while the right-hand-side is increasing in , it su¢ ces to show that the left-hand-side of (45) is increasing in . A few steps of algebra yield
(1 )
Hence we need only show that g ( ) > 0 for all in the relevant range. But note that
since =~ < . 37 Hence, we need only show that g ( ) > 0 when evaluated at the highest possible value of ; which is . But this follows from
This proves that in the steady state of our model with endogenous tightness of the credit constraint,~ is still necessarily an increasing function of . From inspection of the equilibrium values of the closed-economy equilibrium, we can immediately conclude that wages, the rental rate of uninformed capital and the interest rate are larger in a …nancial developed North than in a …nancial underdeveloped South. Hence, for large enough trade frictions it continues to be the case that there is an incentive for capital (both physical as well as …nancial) to ‡ow out of South.
Free Trade Equilibrium
In the main text, we showed that these last conclusions are radically reversed whenever trade in goods is su¢ ciently free. We next show that this reversal continues to be the case in this more complicated dynamic model.
With free trade, the equilibrium steady state value of r and~ are still given by equations (40) and (41), but the equilibrium values of factor prices are now di¤erent functions of~ . Using equations (14), (15) As in the closed economy equilibrium, to show that is increasing in , it su¢ ces to show that the lefthand-side of the above equation is increasing in . But note that this is clearly true, since + (1 ) p
1=
is increasing in for p < 1. Hence, we again have that~ is an increasing function of . This result ensures that, in the free trade equilibrium, wages are increasing in , while the rental rate of uninformed capital and the interest rate are decreasing in . Hence the direction of both types of capital ‡ows are from North to South, just as in the model with "exogenous" credit constraints.
A. 2 The Static Model with General Functional Forms
In this Appendix we extend the static model to general neoclassical production functions and general homothetic preferences. In particular, we assume that each country allows a representative consumer with identical homothetic preferences, by which we can express demand in sector 1 relative to demand in sector 2 as a function (p) of the relative price p. We also assume that both countries have access to the same technologies to produce goods 1 and 2, and that these technologies feature constant returns to scale, continuously diminishing marginal products and no factor intensity reversals. Letting k = K=L, we denote output per worker under each of these technologies by f 1 (k) and f 2 (k). Let us …rst consider the equilibrium of the closed economy. As in the main text, we assume that is low enough to ensure that the credit constraint binds and the amount of capital allocated to sector 1 is K 1 = K. The equilibrium conditions of this economy are:
The …rst condition ensures goods-market equilibrium. The next two conditions characterize optimality in sector 1, while the last two ones characterize optimal behavior in sector 2. Although it is impossible to solve for equilibrium prices and the allocation of labor to each sector as a function of parameters, we can learn a great deal about the characteristics of the equilibrium by using Jones '(1965) hat algebra approach.
Log-di¤erentiating the above system (46) and after a few manipulations we obtain:
( 1 
where hats denote percentage changes in the variables, and the following de…nitions have been used:
These correspond to the elasticity of output with respect to capital in sector i, the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in sector i, and the elasticity of substitution in consumption between goods 1 and 2. The system (47) can be solved to obtainp,ŵ,^ ,^ , and^ 1 as a function of b andk. These expressions shed light on the cross-country variation in prices and the allocation of labor under autarky. We are particularly interested in exploring whether the relative price p is larger in North or South. After some fairly cumbersome algebra we obtainp ( 1 2 (1 1 ) + 1 1 2 )k
It is clear that, other things equal, the relative price p is larger in an economy with a higher degree of …nancial contractibility . This is the e¤ect isolated by our benchmark model, and it is now apparent that it holds more generally. It is straightforward to show that, in the case symmetric productions functions, this immediately implies that p < 1 whenever …nancial constraints bind. The reason for this is that as rises, equilibrium values converge continuously to the allocations of an economy where …nancial constraints do not bind, and in the latter economy we must have p = 1.
Equation (48) also shed lights on the e¤ects of a larger aggregate capital-labor ratios on the relative price p. In the Cobb-Douglas case we had a positive link between p and K=L. In the general case, this continues to be the case provided that
In a frictionless economy, this condition would simply be 1 > 2 , which is our assumption in the main text. Similarly, when 1 = 2 (which is satis…ed in our Cobb-Douglas case), the condition 1 > 2 is again su¢ cient to ensure that p is increasing in K=L. When 2 is su¢ ciently low, however, it may be the case that p is decreasing in K=L. Intuitively, when capital and labor are very complementary in sector 2, an increase in the capital stock increases the allocation of labor to that sector almost proportionately (regardless of factor intensities), and thus expands production in sector 2 relative to production in sector 1. 38 It should be clear, however, than even when condition (49) fails to be satis…ed, the relative price p continues to be lower in South whenever cross-country di¤erences in are larger relative to cross-country di¤erences in K=L.
We can now move to an analysis of the small open economy. Our goal here is to show that, for general technologies and preferences, the rental rate of uninformed capital is an increasing function of p. We again use Jones ' (1965) hat algebra approach, this time ignoring the goods-market condition and treating p as parametric. This amounts to solving forŵ,^ ,^ , and^ 1 as a function ofp;^ andk. We focus here on the value of^ :^ =
( 1 1 + 1 2 (1 1 )) ( 1 2 (1 1 ) + 1 1 2 )p
( 1 ) 1 (1 2 ) ( 1 2 (1 1 ) + 1 1 2 ) (1 )^ 1 (1 2 ) ( 1 2 (1 1 ) + 1 1 2 )k .
Notice that the rental rate is necessarily increasing in p. This con…rms that it is generally the case that, provided that trade integration raises the relative price p in South, it also raises the real reward to uninformed capital. In fact, the coe¢ cient ofp is strictly larger than one (for 2 < 1), and thus =p is also increasing in the relative price p. In words, the return to uninformed capital increases in terms of both sectors'output.
As discussed in the main text, this rise and (and =p) is the key feature that leads to complementarity between trade ‡ows and capital ‡ows in the model. Whether the increase in is large enough to lead to S > N with free trade depends again on whether relative factor endowment di¤erences are large relative to factor intensity di¤erences and di¤erences in …nancial contractibility. As a matter of fact, the condition that ensures S > N is completely analogous to that in the model with Cobb-Douglas functional forms, namely:
Or, more simply, all that we require is that North operates sector 2's technology at a higher capital-labor ratio than South does.
